News

Risk briefing on Yemen – President Saleh’s days are numbered

21/04/2011

The political future of President Abdullah Saleh of Yemen looks untenable in the wake of unprecedented large protests and calls for his departure from Yemenis and the international community alike. Saleh’s government has taken a blow in recent weeks following the departure of key regime supporters. The government’s harsh crackdown against the protest movement has hardened protestors’ commitment to see his 32-year rule ended. The use of Yemini territory by Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) operatives and the country’s control over the Bab al-Mandab Strait (a crucial transit route for oil and LNG shipments), means that a deteriorating domestic situation will reverberate regionally and internationally. Below are the key risks and outlook for the current crisis in Yemen.

Key risks

• The situation in Yemen will remain fraught with risks irrespective of whether President Saleh steps down or is forced from power now or in a few weeks time. Whilst the current crisis in Yemen can be seen as part of the wider protests gripping the MENA region, the country also suffers from specific vulnerabilities. Since early 2004, President Saleh has had to contend with a fluctuating Houthi (Zaidi Shi'ite tribal) insurgency in North Yemen. Sana’a has also struggled with a secessionist movement in the south –one which rejects the unification of northern and southern Yemen in 1990.  These two regional conflicts have forced hundreds of thousands of Yemenis to flee to the capital, Sana, and to slums in cities such as Taiz, Mukalla and Aden – now hotbeds of unrest and anti-government demonstrations. More than in Tunisia and Egypt, Yemenis suffer chronic levels of poverty, deprivation and unemployment. Nepotism and corruption is rampant too. Diplomatic cables from 2009 and 2010, made available via Wikileaks, depict a country verging on becoming a failed-state well before protests took off in Tunisia and elsewhere in the Middle East. As such, it is highly improbable that the situation in Yemen will improve in the short term.
• Concessions may not prevent an increase in unrest. The protesters who first took to the streets in January 2011, wasted no time in calling for the ouster of President Saleh and members of his family from government. In a bid to halt increasingly large demonstrations, Saleh offered to step down before his term ends. He also promised that his son, Ahmed (chief of the Republican Guard), would not seek to inherit the presidency. Saleh has also proposed to hold a referendum on a new constitution and freeze plans to implement previously ear-marked and highly controversial changes that would have removed presidential term limits. Economic concessions have also been forthcoming and focused on token wage increases and extending Yemen’s meagre welfare provisions (US$10 a month) to 500,000 people and promising to tackle unemployment. However, such plans have been rejected by protesters who will not accept anything less than Saleh’s immediate resignation and remain cynical about Saleh’s commitment to implementing his promises. Political opposition movements (and some defectors from the ruling General People’s Congress Party) have now added their voices to those of the Yemen street. This means that reforms and concessions are unlikely to be sufficient to keep Saleh in government.
• Escalating levels of violence will make a peaceful settlement increasingly unlikely.  Whilst Saleh has promised political reform, he has also responded to the protests by mobilising his own supporters against anti-government demonstrators and encouraged the use of force against civilians. Many reliable estimates place the number of protestors killed by government forces in excess of 120 with hundreds more injured and arrested. In a particularly cold-blooded act, forces loyal to Saleh opened fire on protesters and killed more than 50 people on 18 March. Such acts of violence have hardened the resolve of protestors, pushed supporters away from Saleh and made a workable compromise more difficult to achieve. International Crisis Group has noted that, geographically, violence has been worse in governorates that were formerly part of the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (i.e. ‘the south’). Saleh enjoys less control over this region as his family and loyal supporters hail from the north.
• Yemen’s tribal political structure has the ability to reduce and also ignite violent confrontation.  Whilst highly complex and heterogeneous, Yemen’s tribes sense that Saleh’s rule may end imminently and are acting out of self-interest. They are looking to secure their power bases in a post-Saleh Yemen. In a notable defection, Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar (a formerly powerful commander of Yemen’s North-West military division and a member of Saleh’s tribe) announced on 21 March that he was shifting allegiances to the protesters. On 13 April, violent clashes between security forces loyal to President Saleh clashed with those supporting Gen Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar, potentially precipitating more serious military confrontations which would be difficult to contain. Furthermore, whilst Saleh was previously able to rely on support from Yemen’s most powerful northern tribe (the Hashids), the 2007 death of its head, Abduallah al-Ahmar, has reduced the president’s support base. Al-Ahmar’s sons now follow their own agenda. Since the uprisings began, two of al-Ahmar’s sons, Hussein and Hameed, have joined calls for Saleh to resign and are using their influence amongst kinsmen to push Saleh out of office.
• Many fear that al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) could flourish amidst the turmoil. In view of the risk, the US has tentatively expressed its support for Saleh to step down. Washington’s previous reluctance to pressure Saleh to relinquish power derives from the fact that the Yemini president has been a key ally in US counter-terrorism operations since 11 September 2011. He also positioned himself as the only bulwark against al-Qaeda and anarchy in Yemen. As such, the US has trained Yemeni counter-terrorism units and sent military assistance to Yemen.
• The risk posed by AQAP operatives based in Yemen is significant both regionally and internationally. Acts of terrorism in the West have been linked to individuals of Yemeni origin. Commentators believe Saleh has manipulated US fears regarding al-Qaeda and used its military hardware to crush political opponents rather than ‘terrorists’. However, even if Saleh survives this latest challenge to his leadership, he is unlikely to be able to assert control over much of the country. The regime’s limited success in tackling AQAP means the organisation stands only to benefit from the unrest and Saleh cannot make good his promise to quash militant Islam.  
• Yemen’s energy infrastructure represents an attractive target to militants and anti-government protesters.  Canadian producer Calvalley Petroleum has confirmed that its pipeline that ships 50,000 to 70,000 barrels a day had to be shut down following an attack “by tribesmen” in March. Austria’s OMV has halted production and evacuated foreign employees since March 18. This was due to a rebel attack targeting the country's main export oil pipeline. It should also not be forgotten that many members of the Saleh family are key players in providing transportation and other services to companies that extract and process fossil fuels. As Saleh (and his family) are already the focus of popular antipathy, it is not inconceivable that they will be forced out of powerful political, military and business positions and this could disrupt operations. Nevertheless, an April 2011 statement by Christophe de Margerie - the CEO of Total - indicated that oil and gas output has not been unduly affected by the unrest. Reports of gas shortages to Yemeni homes and fears of food shortages may intensify the protests however and prolong the crisis. 
• Fears have also been raised over the 18-mile Bab al-Mandab Strait. The strategically important shipping lane carries 3bn barrels a day of oil, and some fear that lawlessness could increase risks to tankers travelling from the Persian Gulf and Gulf of Aden to the Suez Canal and the Mediterranean Sea. This could contribute to further rises in global oil prices which are already inflated due to fears of disruptions to supply.

Outlook

• The likelihood of Saleh remaining in power remains slim which means that the real challenge is to ensure that Yemen witnesses a peaceful transition. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) initiative which was launched on 8 April is critical in this respect. The GCC has proposed that Saleh hand power over to his vice-president. Yemen's opposition has rejected the deal because it does not call on the president to step down immediately. The success of the talks, which remain inconclusive and fraught with difficulties, is important particularly for Saudi Arabia. Riyadh fears that neighbouring Yemen will become a failed state. Like the US, Saudi Arabia is anxious about the influence and interference of Iran. Tehran is thought to have provided support to Houthi rebels in the north of the country (although Iran denies this). The likelihood of a Saudi military intervention looks unlikely and a UN Security Council meeting on 19 April regarding Yemen failed to articulate a clear solution to the problem.
• The outlook for Yemen remains negative in the short and medium term. Whilst Saleh has been unable to prevent a large number of defections, the opposition remains strongly divided and weak. Saleh’s 32- year rule has also left the country bereft of institutions that would facilitate a move towards democracy. Whilst Gen Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar’s shift of support to the protestors has dealt Saleh a blow, the general has not been welcomed by anti-government pro-democracy supporters. The general alienated many in the north by leading a military campaign there, and many speculate he has links to AQAP. He also remains tainted by his long-standing support for the Saleh regime. Now that Saleh’s departure appears to be almost certain, powerful tribal alliances are looking to share the spoils of a post-Saleh Yemen. This threatens to frustrate calls for democratisation by Yemen’s fledgling youth movement. The situation in Yemen therefore remains complex, dynamic and fraught with risk.

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