News

Syria briefing: risk factors and buffers to unrest

23/05/2011

Image courtesy of freeedomania - flickr

In late January 2011, President Bashar al-Assad stated that Syria was immune to the type of unrest witnessed in Tunisia and Egypt. Such a statement rings hollow in light of country-wide demonstrations for political reform over the last nine weeks. The protests pose the greatest challenge to Bashar al-Assad since he stepped into his father's shoes in 2000. Demonstrations have not as yet developed the tsunami thrust of Tunisia or Egypt, but the regime has not been able to prevent tens of thousands of protesters from demonstrating.

President al-Assad has reason to fear that the momentum could increase further. International sanctions targeting the Ba’athist regime directly are increasingly adding to the pressure on al-Assad, and may spur further protests.  The regime's determination to crack down on protests and their intensity suggest that the already high level of violence is likely to increase in the short term. As this continues, a political solution to the conflict is becoming increasingly unlikely. Continuously high levels of violence, meanwhile, are increasing the possibility that the conflict will take on a clearer sectarian dimension.  Below are some of the key risk factors and buffers to unrest in Syria.

Risk factors

• Strategically important parts of Syria have not been immune to protest and this has been a source of concern for the regime. Deraa, conventionally regarded as a stronghold of the leadership, remains the hotbed of reformist protests. A Sunni-dominated tribal region, Deraa is regarded as a home and support base for leaders in the government and military. The coastal city of Latakia, which has witnessed protests and a brutal response by the security forces, is also significant in this regard. The port is notable in that it has an Alawite majority. The Alawites continue to hold the reins of power in Syria and the most prominent member of the Shi'ite offshoot remains Bashar al-Assad.
• The Ba'athist regime is rightly concerned about the risk that protests will increase further in intensity. Over the last nine weeks, protests ranging from a few hundred demonstrators to tens of thousands have taken place in urban centres across the country. Thousands of protesters have defied the increasingly strong attempts to crack down on anti-government protests. Despite the failure to organise a countrywide general strike on 18 May, large numbers of people have continued to take to the streets. Although the threat of reprisals from the regime is likely to have been a determining factor in preventing the general strike, a significant number of people have continued to defy the increasingly forceful attempts to quash unrest.
• Al-Assad is becoming increasingly concerned that unrest in restive Kurdish regions could add to the intensity of protests. Members of Syria's long-suffering Kurdish minority have also joined the fray. They have intentionally avoided simply demanding greater cultural rights, most notably in the form of Syrian citizenship. The majority are also demanding an end to repression, freedom and democratic reform. On 1 April, several hundred Kurds reportedly marched in the north-eastern streets of Qamishli and Amuda to protest against the Ba'athist regime. In response, Bashar al-Assad announced on 7 April that people living in the country's eastern Hasaka governorate would be granted Syrian citizenship. Between 150,000 and 300,000 Kurds are expected to benefit from the initiative. The decision has widely been interpreted as an attempt to ensure that a Kurdish mass uprising in north-eastern Syria does not take place. Although large numbers of Kurds have continued to participate in protests, Kurdish opposition figures have reportedly not ruled out engaging with the regime.
• The majority of measures by al-Assad to diffuse public anger are widely seen as cosmetic or fake and similar to the unsuccessful concessions made by former President Ben Ali in Tunisia and former President Hosni Mubarak in Egypt before they were forced from power. In a bid to placate protesters al-Assad has freed hundreds of prisoners (primarily Islamists), accepted the resignation of the cabinet and promised to end the notorious state of emergency which has been in force since 1963. The state of emergency was lifted on 19 April 2011, although a conflicting message was released the same day by the Interior Ministry which forbade protests. The security forces have continued to kill, torture and arrest protesters while the drafting of new anti-terrorism legislation has acted as another carte blanch to justify government oppression and impunity amongst the security forces. It is known that the cabinet answers to the president and has little executive power.
• So long as the perception persists that the government is not serious about reform, an end to wide-spread protests and social upheaval seems unlikely. Apart from the above-mentioned measures, presidential spokesperson Bouthaina Shaaban promised in late-March a rise in workers' wages, the introduction of health reforms, the establishment of a mechanism to fight corruption, and measures to allow more political parties to compete in elections. However, the government had announced a similar package of reforms in 2005 with little to show as a result. It is notable, for instance, that Syria continues to rank as an extreme risk country in Maplecroft's Business Integrity and Corruption Index.
• Targeted US and EU sanctions are placing the regime under increased pressure. ‘Smart sanctions,’ including direct sanctions targeting al-Assad and key senior politicians, are noteworthy. Sanctions damaging Syria’s economy may encourage protesters to maintain or increase pressure on the regime. However, shifting the balance decisively in favour of the protest movement is likely to require even greater pressure on the Syrian economy. Countrywide protests in the days preceding Mubarak’s ouster in Egypt was a key factor in turning the armed forces against the ancien regime. Achieving a similar result in Syria may ultimately depend on the ability of protesters to bring the economy to its knees.

Buffers

• The Ba'athist regime's heavy-handed security response may nonetheless contain the momentum of protests, at least in the short term. The increasing use of heavy weaponry such as tanks, artillery, and mortars in an attempt to break the momentum of the protests indicates that the regime has hardened its approach. Reports of arrests, beatings and torture in custody meanwhile persist. Around 850 people are believed to have been killed in the government crackdown as of 23 May 2011. An end to the stalemate between anti-government protesters and the regime remains unlikely in the short term. Given that the regime has reneged on its promises to not use force against demonstrators during protests on 13 May, President Bashar al-Assad is unlikely to be able to solve the crisis politically. However, as protests have spread across the country, government security forces have resorted to greater violence and brutality. It remains a possibility, nonetheless, that the security forces' violent response will add further momentum to the protest movement and increase the level of opposition to the regime.
• The military is structured to preserve the interests of the ruling Alawite minority and few Syrians view the army as a benign entity that can be trusted. Alawite officers continue to dominate the top brass, and Sunni generals do not enjoy real executive power within the armed forces. Nonetheless, as the civil uprising gathers momentum and spreads across the country, it is not altogether inconceivable that less senior members of the armed forces and / or those who are less beholden to the regime may turn against the line of command. Unconfirmed reports have suggested that a significant portion of the 5th army division, including high ranking officers, have defected. Eye witnesses report that soldiers from the 5th division intervened on 26 April 2011 to protect unarmed residents of Deraa from the 4th division. The Alawite-dominated 4th division is led by Maher Assad, Bashar's brother. The central role of the 4th division in the crackdown against anti-government protests underlines that the regime is concerned about the loyalty of the army's rank-and-file. By relying mainly on Alawite divisions, however, the regime risks fuelling further resentment of the minority community.
• Bashar al-Assad also draws comfort from the fact that he enjoys a base of support which extends beyond the Alawite minority. This has for instance been reflected in pro-government demonstrations in Damascus. The oppressive nature of the regime makes it nigh impossible to reflect on the true level of support enjoyed by Bashar al-Assad. Yet, the Ba'athist party will continue to use pro-government protesters and violence to counter and discourage protests staged by those who demand change.
• The resilience and survival mindset of the Alawites and the al-Assad family in particular counts in their favour. Although constituting merely 12% of the population, Syria's Alawites have monopolised power for decades. The level of oppression that the al-Assad regime has resorted to in order to discourage dissent is believed to have fuelled resentment amongst Syria's Sunni majority, which constitutes approximately three-quarters of the total population. The stakes are therefore particularly high for Bashar al-Assad and members of the Alawite elite and they are unlikely to relinquish power without putting up a fight. The 1982 crackdown to neutralise a Muslim Brotherhood rebellion in Hama (where more than 20,000 were killed) and the quashing of a Kurdish rebellion in 2004, underline the regime's willingness to resort to extreme force irrespective of casualty numbers when necessary.

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