News

Libya Briefing: risk factors going forward

05/04/2011

As the coalition-enforced no-fly zone

As the coalition-enforced no-fly zone is handed over to NATO, the situation on the ground in Libya remains tenuous. Col. Gaddafi remains in nominal control of at least portions of the country, including the capital. Key towns have switched from rebel and loyalist control and back again. A meeting of various officials in London on 29 March underlines the growing willingness of the core Western coalition to move toward the removal of Col. Gaddafi himself. This is despite such action not being explicitly sanctioned by UN resolution 1973. At the meeting, American and British officials agreed that the UN resolution loosened restrictions on arms shipments to the rebels.

International action in Libya has been met with growing suspicion among domestic constituencies in the United States and Great Britain. Audiences at home have expressed their grave concern over the long-term agenda of the military and political leadership, further challenging the political resolve of President Obama and Prime Minister David Cameron. France meanwhile appears to desire increased military intervention. Libya may well be in for a protracted conflict.

The American public’s worry of ‘a new Iraq’ has surely played a role in Washington’s move on 4th April to hand over command to NATO. Obama and his Defence Secretary, Robert Gates, already made it clear that no American soldiers would enter Libya. However US intelligence assets are said to be on the ground inside Libya, providing logistical intelligence and other support to rebel forces and coalition air strikes. Wavering domestic support undermines the political resolve for the intervention, in spite of the grave humanitarian implications. The international coalition now faces critical choices over the shape of the intervention.

Islamist involvement underscores future concerns over rebel forces

• Arms and training will be pivotal in allowing the rebels to push back Gaddafi’s forces, but Western officials are afraid that Islamists will benefit. The US and Britain are weary of inadvertently supporting and arming any future militant Islamist forces. Islamists (including the conservative variety) are likely to contend for power if and when the Gaddafi regime falls. There are troubling signs that radical Islamists are exploiting the conflict to emplace themselves for the long haul. This includes al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and Islamists back from fighting in Afghanistan who are now reportedly part of the Libyan rebellion.
• Arming the rebels will also jeopardise the reluctant support of NATO member Turkey and the Arab League. Turkey’s support hinges on NATO not going beyond its role in enforcing the no-fly zone. Ankara also wants to maintain the country’s position as a potential mediator and broker as well as a source of stability in MENA. Arming rebels would preclude Turkey’s role vis-à-vis NATO efforts, and could precipitate prolonged conflict and terrorism.

Opposition fragmented

• The Libyan opposition remains critically disjointed. As a spontaneous uprising, a truly unified opposition body has been sorely absent. Whilst some security officials and military commanders have switched sides, the rebels do not have formal military units. Reluctant leaders, from professors to petroleum engineers, struggle to bring order to untrained and youthful volunteers. The so-called Libyan Interim Council lacks coherent leadership and popular support.
• Internal strife among Libya’s patchwork opposition increases the likelihood of prolonged unrest following Col. Gaddafi’s eventual removal from power. It is possible, if not likely, that a post-Gaddafi Libya will witness tribal, sectarian and regional strife.
• Vital training and weapons are also sorely lacking. Support in this regard is threatened as Western leaders grow more concerned over alleged Islamist penetration of rebel forces. Weaponry will be useless without the know-how to use those weapons. Training in the numbers needed to confront loyalists will be hard to achieve in covert operations, and any such weapons may ultimately end up in Islamist hands and used in future conflict.

High-level defections come as a positive development, but scepticism persists

• The highest level defection yet, that of Libya’s Foreign Minister and Gaddafi-friend Mousa Kousa, signals the deterioration of the Libyan leader’s support base. Indeed, if Kousa is not charged with war crimes his example may serve to encourage further defections, thus leaving Col. Gaddafi critically isolated. But not all officials are abandoning the Libyan ship. Deputy Foreign Minister Abdelati Obeidu visited Greece on 3 April, where he reportedly delivered a message calling for a ceasefire and end to hostilities.
• It is unclear what concrete offers the Libyan government is willing to make, and ceasefires and calls for mediation are not likely to be received well by the coalition. Col. Gaddafi should not expect a peace deal that leaves him with any semblance of authority. That Obeidu should be aware of this is to be expected. As such, his intentions during his trip abroad are highly questionable.
• Further signs that the regime is seeking a peaceful way out came from Col. Gaddafi’s sons, Seif al-Islam and Saadi Gaddafi. Seif is reported to have suggested a compromise transition, to be overseen by Seif himself, with his father relinquishing control. A constitutional democracy would then be put in place. But Seif’s offer will not be received well by the coalition or the rebels. Seif was once seen as a reformer, poised to spearhead democratic change in Libya. Instead, he has come to symbolize the cruelty and duplicity of the regime. The rebel Transitional National Council has also rejected the suggestion that any member of Gaddafi’s family remain in control.

Coalition air strikes have resolutely diminished Col. Gaddafi’s ability to counter rebel offenses by the air. Yet he maintains sufficient support on the ground to prevent outright gains for more than short periods of time. Arming and training the rebels appears the next likely step for the coalition, yet the effectiveness of this is far from clear.

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