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Maplecroft releases Egypt briefing which shows that sectarian divisions are causing difficulties in Egypt’s political transition

10/05/2011

Briefing last updated - 10 May 2011 (17:30pm GMT).

Egypt briefing: divisions highlight challenges to political transition

Violent clashes on 7 May 2011 in the Imbaba district of Cairo highlight rising tensions between Egypt’s conservative Muslims and Coptic Christians. The violence, which left 12 dead and hundreds injured, involved the burning of two churches and an apartment building which is home to many Christians. At least two Christian-owned stores were also ransacked. Rioters threw Molotov cocktails and stones and live ammunition was reportedly fired before the military intervened. Sectarian tensions will place further strains on Egyptian society and disruptions to business operations are likely. A number of key risk trends are notable:

• Egypt’s sectarian strife risks increasing as the country undergoes a democratic transition. Interest groups, including political parties and the country’s main religious factions, now compete for political ground. This is taking place in a new environment defined by freedom of expression and an invigorated sense of civic activism. Such freedoms facilitate greater public demonstrations from all sides and this risks inflaming lingering tensions as the political stakes become higher. While Egypt’s Coptic minority worries that it may lose out in the post-Mubarak era, conservative Muslims are becoming increasingly assertive.  Although the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) has vowed to use an ‘iron fist’ to prevent further violence between the faiths, there is a real risk that sectarian conflict will increase further.
• While sectarian tensions have deep roots in Egypt, recent violence shows an upsurge in the frequency and lethality of clashes since the fall of former President Hosni Mubarak. On 8 March 2011, sectarian clashes in the Helwan governorate left 11 people dead (Six Christian and five Muslim), following demonstration over an earlier burning of a church by Salafists. Rumours of an interfaith romance added to the tensions. In April, Muslims protested for the resignation of a new government-appointed Coptic governor in the Qena governorate. The military’s stance remains somewhat unclear. Its sometimes slow reaction time to violence is countered by its stern public announcements. This contradiction, combined with the long-standing sectarian strains and ideological orientation of the Salafists, will likely reduce the effectiveness of the military’s deterrent role.
• The spark behind the 7th May clash was similar to that which motivated previous violence, and further sectarian clashes are likely. This time it was the rumour that a Christian woman who converted to Islam was being held captive inside a church or apartment in the neighbourhood. The rumour was started just hours after the televised appearance of Kamilia Shehata, the wife of a Christian priest who was also rumoured to have converted to Islam and kidnapped by Copts in 2010. That rumour was used by the al-Qaeda-affiliated Islamic State of Iraq as an excuse to carry out a large-scale attack on a Christian church in Baghdad on 2 November 2010. The attack resulted in at least 58 deaths. Threats stemming from the same rumour were also linked to the 1 January 2011 bombing of a Coptic church in Alexandria which left 23 Christians dead. The power that such rumours have (especially among Egypt’s Salafists) may create or strengthen links between radical elements inside Egypt with extremists outside the country.
• Whether any of the rumours have merit is less important than the actions taken in response. The vehement response of Salafists to the above-mentioned stories reflects the growing voice of ultra-conservative and radical Islamists in Egypt. The recent behavior of Salafists towards less conservative Muslims underscores the breadth of their new activism. On 10 May a woman appearing on television claimed to be the kidnapped convert in Imbaba, but her identity has not yet been confirmed, nor has her story. What truth there is to the claims is unclear. What is clear, however, is the rallying effect such stories now have in causing Egypt’s more radical Islamist to resort to violence.
• The use of mobile phones and twitter, essential to the anti-regime protests, were used by extremists to foment the recent unrest. The use of such technology raises the risk from these groups, as they can better coordinate their activities and catch security forces off guard. As with the use of social networking and mobile phones to organize peaceful protests, conservative Islamists now appear more likely to utilize this technology for their own ends. While the recent violence appears local in its origin and scope, there is the chance that such radicalization may find a wider reach through new media. This would expand the risk of sectarian fervor much as pro-democracy activism has already spread throughout the region.
• The race is now on to compete in September’s parliamentary election. Various interest groups are vying to set principle frameworks to delimitate the rights of minorities and the role of Islam in a ‘new’ Egypt. There is some risk that this will stoke sectarian violence, as reflected in contemporary clashes. While this dynamic is unlikely to result in wide-scale conflict, it nonetheless runs the risk of leaving the Muslim Brotherhood, the best organised group with widespread popular support, dominating the elections. 
• The spirit of unity that marked the public face of the ‘revolution’ risks fragmenting at an accelerated rate. Underscoring the difficulties intrinsic to Egypt’s transition, nascent political parties convened on the same day as the Imbaba violence for the “First Conference of Egypt: Towards Protecting the Revolution”. At the conference, activists and party members old and new sought to establish their principles, plan for the eventual drafting of a new constitution, and raise bases of support in time for parliamentary elections scheduled for September.
• Banning former members of Egypt’s ruling party risks alienating members of the country’s elite. Among the core issues of the day is the banning of members of the former ruling National Democratic Party (NDP) from politics for an as-yet undefined period of time. Such a ban would weaken the ability of former officials from the Mubarak regime to retain power in a new government, yet it may also perpetuate divisions in Egyptian society. As with Iraq following the banning of Saddam Hussein’s Ba’ath Party, Egypt will need the technocratic abilities and political know-how of individuals with real experience. Moreover, the sheer number of NDP members means that a large number of successful and ambitious members of society will be effectively barred from participating in politics. This runs the risk of inflaming animosity and fomenting more insidious resentment even amongst the elite, who may then seek to undermine the government.

Maplecroft’s in-depth Country Report on Egypt contains high level analysis of the key national and sector risks to companies and investors, plus country scores, maps, key recent events and stakeholder viewpoints.

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